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   ABSTRACT
In this paper, I discuss full-blooded 
Platonism (the claim that all possible 
mathematical objects exist) as a response 
to the skeptical problem in the philosophy 
of mathematics as to how empirical 
b e i n g s  c a n  c o g n i z e  n o n - e m p i r i c a l 
mathematical objects. I then attempt to 
develop an analogous position regarding 
the applicability of concepts to reality in 
response to the skeptical problem regarding 
how we can cognize an objective reality 
through human-constructed concepts. 
If all concepts meeting certain minimal 
conditions structure reality under some 
aspect, then objective knowledge is possible, 
regardless of how these concepts arose 
historically.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Realism in the philosophy of mathematics leads naturally to an 
epistemological problem of access. Namely, how do we, as empirical 
beings in an empirical world, obtain knowledge about non-empirical 
mathematical objects? As Paul Benacerraf points out, a belief state 
(ordinarily) only counts as a knowledge state if it is caused by its 
object. Because non-empirical mathematical objects are non-
causal, this implies that mathematical knowledge is impossible given 
mathematical Platonism (the claim that mathematical truths are true 
descriptions of such non-empirical mathematical objects). Full-
blooded Platonists try to avoid this skeptical conclusion by claiming 
that all possible mathematical objects exist. With mere knowledge 
of possibility not requiring such a causal link, we can attain 
mathematical knowledge without mathematical objects being able to 
cause our belief states.
Realism as a more general metaphysical position faces a seemingly 
dissimilar skeptical argument with, I believe, a similar solution. All 
of our cognition is conceptual, even basic sense-perception. When I 
see a cup, I do not merely experience a bundle of sensations, but my 
act of perception has a conceptual content which alone allows me to 
come to know something in this act. But, our concepts are not set in 
stone. Rather, they are a product of our cultural context and place 
in history. A nineteenth-century gentleman would not be able to 
cognize my laptop as a laptop. How, then, can we attain knowledge 
of an independently existing reality through such concepts? Plainly, 
this reality must, in some way, already be “structured” by these 
concepts independently of our activity if a correspondence between 
them and our beliefs is to be possible. But, to establish such a 
correspondence would seemingly require some privileged position 
independent of any conceptual framework. In the absence of this, 
to maintain the possibility of objective knowledge, we must posit a 
multi-aspectual reality such that any conceptual framework meeting 
certain minimal conditions can be regarded as structuring reality 
in one of its aspects. Such a position I call, by virtue of the analogy 
with full-blooded Platonism, full-blooded conceptual realism. I 
argue here that this position is necessary for us to conceptualize 
the possibility of our attaining objective knowledge as culturally-
situated subjects, just as full-blooded Platonism is necessary for us to 
conceptualize the possibility of our attaining mathematical knowledge 
as spatiotemporally-situated subjects.
II. FULL-BLOODED PLATONISM AS A RESPONSE TO 
BENACERRAF
Benacerraf provides a popular way of formulating the problem of 
how it is that knowledge of mathematical objects is possible without a 
causal link.1 As philosophers, we should pursue, as much as possible, 
the achievement of a unified theory of knowledge and meaning. Thus, 
to the extent that we understand certain things about the meaning and 
conditions for knowledge of empirical propositions, we should like 
to extend these truths to apply to mathematical propositions.2 But, to 
interpret mathematical propositions analogously with empirical ones 
is to say that mathematical objects exist in some strong metaphysical 
sense.3 Because we cannot plausibly identify such existent mathematical 
objects with any objects in the empirical world, we must posit them 
as ideal objects existing non-spatiotemporally. In other words, we 
must be mathematical Platonists in a sufficiently broad sense. Yet, 
for my belief about an empirical object to count as knowledge, the 
existence of the object necessarily “must figure in a suitable way in a 
causal explanation of [my] belief.”4 If we, in accord with our desire 
for theoretical unity, extend this principle of empirical knowledge to 
mathematical knowledge, then, in accord with our earlier Platonism 
where mathematical objects are non-spatiotemporal and thus acausal, 
we must deny that mathematical knowledge is possible.
Mark Balaguer counters Benacerraf by offering a positive account 
of how mathematical knowledge is possible despite this lack of a causal 
link, which he calls full-blooded Platonism. This is the claim that “all 
the mathematical objects which possibly could exist actually do exist.”5 
Full-blooded Platonism gets around the requirement of a causal link 
for knowledge, because the correspondence between our beliefs about 
mathematical objects and those objects themselves is accomplished 
simply by the fact that whatever claim we make or mathematical theory 
we suggest (so long as it is logically possible or consistent, i.e., not self-
contradictory), there must exist some mathematical objects for which 
this claim or this theory would be true. If all possible mathematical 
objects exist, then for me to have knowledge of mathematical objects 
1 While Benacerraf’s argument is typically taken as an argument against 
Platonism rather than as one for skepticism, strictly speaking, its 
conclusion is that Platonism is incompatible with the possibility of 
mathematical knowledge, which implies skepticism given Platonism.
2 Paul Benacerraf, “Mathematical Truth,” The Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 19 
(1973): 666-67, 10.2307/2025075.
3 Benacerraf, “Mathematical Truth,” 663.
4 Benacerraf, “Mathematical Truth,” 671.
5 Mark Balaguer, “A Platonist Epistemology,” Synthese 103, no. 3 (1995): 304, 
10.1007/bf01089731.
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it is sufficient for me to “dream up” an applicable mathematical object 
of some kind, so long as the existence of this object would not imply a 
contradiction.6
One worry about full-blooded Platonism is this: how can we 
know that our mathematical theories are consistent without access to 
the objects these theories are about? Balaguer responds to this critique 
by noting that our knowledge of the consistency of empirical claims 
does not depend on our having access to their objects.7 “I do not 
need access to the seventh child born in 1991 in order to know that 
the sentences asserting [them] to be female and Italian are consistent 
with each other.”8 Thus, under full-blooded Platonism, we can attain 
mathematical knowledge despite the lack of any metaphysical relation 
that would bring us into contact with them.
III. THE CULTURAL RELATIVITY OF CONCEPTS AS AN 
ARGUMENT FOR SKEPTICISM
Can a generalized version of full-blooded Platonism fill the role 
with regard to general skepticism that full-blooded Platonism does 
with regard to skepticism about mathematical knowledge? That is, 
not providing a refutation of skepticism, but rather making clear the 
conceptual possibility of a non-skeptical epistemological position 
on the basis of certain metaphysical claims. The particular kind 
of general skepticism I have in mind is one based on the cultural 
relativity of concepts. If all of our cognition is by way of concepts and 
all concepts are culturally relative, then how can we attain knowledge 
of an objective world? Why should we think that the world contains, 
independently of us, things corresponding to just these concepts with 
which we make our judgments? Friedrich Nietzsche seems to suggest 
an argument like this when he says, “Truths are illusions which we 
have forgotten are illusions—they are metaphors that have become 
worn out and have been drained of sensuous force.”9 All of our 
concepts are formed out of experience by way of a process of metaphor 
and abstraction.10 This process, obscured in the subsequent use of the 
concepts so formed, is both arbitrary and culturally contingent. Thus, 
judgments made with such concepts cannot claim to capture reality in 
its essential nature, only our own cognitive processes.
6 Balaguer, “Platonist Epistemology,” 304.
7 Balaguer, “Platonist Epistemology,” 320.
8 Balaguer, “Platonist Epistemology,” 320-21.
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” in Truth: 
Engagements Across Philosophical Traditions, ed. José Medina and David Wood 
(Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 17.
10 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies,” 16.
So, what does this general skepticism look like? This argument 
begins with the premise that all knowledge is conceptual, a relatively 
non-controversial claim. After all, we typically think of the immediate 
object of knowledge as a proposition. When I know something, what 
I know is a proposition, and only through this do I know an object. 
For example, I know of my red coffee cup (when my knowledge 
of it is propositional) by virtue of knowing that my coffee cup is 
red. Knowledge of this kind, propositional knowledge, is obviously 
conceptual insofar as a proposition is built up out of concepts.
We might, however, be inclined to think that perception amounts 
to an immediate kind of knowledge that is non-conceptual, which 
would thus allow us to escape from the cultural relativity of concepts. 
These underlying perceptions, then, would be non-conceptual and 
thus, at the most, biologically rather than culturally relative. Whether 
or not there exists such immediate sensations, Edmund Husserl’s 
phenomenology makes it clear that such a sensation could count 
neither as perception nor as knowledge. For a mental state to count 
as knowledge or as perception, it must refer to some object as what is 
known or perceived, i.e., it must be intentional.11 For this intentionality 
of a mental state, sensation alone is insufficient.12 Sensation must be 
afforded sense, or meaning, by an act of consciousness for it to refer 
and, thus, for it to count as knowledge or as perception.13 Although 
perhaps I could passively receive sensations of redness, for me to 
perceive something on the basis of these, e.g., my coffee cup, requires 
me to afford these sensations with conceptuality.
The second premise of this general skeptical argument is that 
all of our concepts are culturally relative. Thus, we can only know 
reality insofar as it is likewise something constituted by our individual 
cultural contexts and conceptual frameworks. Without giving a detailed 
argument for this position, I can give two examples of this relativity of 
concepts in order to motivate the conclusion with regard to concepts 
in general. When we try to think of concepts that are not culturally 
relative, two plausible suggestions are basic sensory concepts and the 
concepts of logic and mathematics. It is undoubtedly on this basis that 
the rationalists and empiricists, in their attempts to overcome cultural 
particularity, turned to mathematical reason and sensory experience, 
respectively.14 Yet, Ludwig Wittgenstein gives us reason to think even 
11 Edmund Husserl, Ideas I, trans. Daniel Dahlstrom (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
2014), 169.
12 Husserl, Ideas I, 172.
13 Husserl, Ideas I, 173.
14 Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 178.
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these concepts are culturally relative. For in a culture where everyone 
had a crushing fear of the number 13, they might conceivably skip 13 
when counting and on the basis of this, a totally different system of 
mathematics than ours would arise.15 Likewise, we could imagine a 
culture where the colors were taught to children very differently than 
in ours, such that what we regard as simple or “primary” colors would 
be regarded as mixtures of other colors and vice-versa.16 Supposing that 
the case is similar with all our other concepts, the cultural relativity of 
all knowledge follows.
IV. SCIENCE AND ETHICS AS PRIVILEGED STANDPOINTS
While Wittgenstein denies that either mere sensation or pure 
reason can provide privileged positions from which to cognize an 
objective reality, we can find reasons to think that science and ethics 
can. Charles Sanders Peirce suggested the former, arguing that only 
in science is there “any distinction of a right and a wrong way” and 
therefore any possibility of knowledge or justification in a non-trivial 
sense.17 Emmanuel Levinas suggested the latter, arguing that culturally 
relative meaning is only possible “on the basis of the epiphany of a 
face,” i.e., the appearance of another person as one to whom I am 
responsible, which thus precedes culture and “enables one to judge 
it.”18 Without some method of intersubjective verification with 
reference to an independently existing object of knowledge, Peirce says, 
there is no sense of truth and falsity which is binding for all, or in other 
words, of “truth as something public.”19 Similarly, Levinas says that 
knowledge requires the possibility of critique and so it is only possible 
given the other person who puts into question my arbitrary freedom.20 
Else, we could draw no distinction between knowledge and opinion. 
Thus, by virtue of science having an independent object and of ethical 
responsibility being a precondition for all meaning or knowledge, they 
seem to escape the relativity of our culturally specific concepts.
While the idea that any objective knowledge must be in some 
sufficiently broad sense “scientific,” (i.e., have an independent object) 
the properties of which can be intersubjectively verified, and likewise 
15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, ed. Cora 
Diamond (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 83.
16 Wittgenstein, Foundations of Mathematics, 235.
17 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles 
Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1931-1935, 1958), 5.385.
18 Emmanuel Levinas, “Meaning and Sense,” in Collected Philosophical Papers, 
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 102; 100.
19 Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.384.
20 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2016), 85.
must be grounded in ethical responsibility, will be significant for the 
position sketched out below, neither of these philosophers’ views can 
stand alone as an adequate response to our general skeptical argument. 
For them to do so, either science or ethics would have to be able 
to provide a privileged conceptual framework in accordance with 
which all of objective reality could be described, along with norms to 
distinguish this unique “objective” reality from all the others, which 
would thereby be reduced to mere illusion. This is John McDowell’s 
point when he says that to conceive of scientific reasoning broadly 
enough that it is even plausible that it is not itself culturally relative is 
to conceive of it so broadly so as to be unable to determine by means of 
scientific reasoning the one true conceptual framework which captures 
the world as it really is.21
At most, then, science conceived this way can give us minimal 
conditions for knowledge of reality, not a privileged standpoint on 
reality. Something similar, I think, can be said about the claim that 
ethics gives us objective reality in some privileged sense. For even if 
my responsibility to the other person must precede the particularities 
of culture in order to establish language, the way in which this 
responsibility gets actualized in concrete acts seems to vary culturally. 
Therefore, this responsibility does not even give us a determinate set 
of ethical norms, much less a way of determining reality as a whole in 
opposition to illusory culturally particular pictures of reality.
V. FULL-BLOODED CONCEPTUAL REALISM
Thus, all of our knowledge is mediated by concepts, but these 
concepts are all culturally relative. So, the reality that we know 
through them must likewise be culturally relative and, in this sense, 
not an objective reality at all. In the absence of any possibility of 
non-conceptual knowledge, it seems that objective knowledge is 
only possible if objective reality correlates with some privileged set 
of concepts, such that knowledge claims made using this conceptual 
framework can map onto said framework. Yet, neither science nor 
ethics provide us with such a determinate conceptual framework that 
could uniquely “structure” reality in this way, insofar as to conceive 
of these in a way that is even plausibly non-relative is to conceive of 
them so abstractly so as to remove the specificity necessity for them 
to serve such a function. Objective knowledge, thus, seems to be an 
impossibility.
On the surface, this skeptical argument bears little resemblance to 
that which we can draw from Benacerraf. Both, however, are ultimately 
21 John McDowell, “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World,” 
in Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 126.
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based on the lack of any basis on which to decide between possible 
alternatives. Without some means of access, we cannot rationally 
decide between possible mathematical theories. Without a privileged 
standpoint, we cannot rationally decide between possible conceptual 
frameworks under which reality can be described. But, if all possible 
(i.e., non-contradictory) mathematical theories correctly describe 
some universe of mathematical objects, then such a means of access 
is unnecessary for mathematical knowledge. Likewise, if all possible 
conceptual frameworks allow us to describe some aspect of objective 
reality, then a privileged standpoint from which to decide between 
them is unnecessary for objective knowledge.
This idea, which I call full-blooded conceptual realism, 
requires further clarification on two points in which it differs 
from full-blooded Platonism. First, for full-blooded Platonism, 
all possible mathematical theories describe some universe of 
existent mathematical objects. This is obviously untenable for non-
mathematical propositions. It is unique to the kind of being that 
mathematical objects have that all possible mathematical objects 
exist.22 Instead, we must say that all possible conceptual frameworks 
can give rise to descriptions of objective reality. A conceptual 
framework is not itself a theory or set of claims that can be true or 
false, but rather an interconnected set of concepts on the basis of 
which we can make claims that can be true or false. To say that these 
claims are descriptions of objective reality is to say that their truth 
or falsity does not depend on the factual existence of any subject 
(except insofar as they are claims about factually existent subjects). 
Thus, to say that all possible conceptual frameworks can give rise to 
descriptions of objective reality is to say that even if no factual subject 
existed, objective reality would still conform to the ontological 
structures necessary for it to be describable using concepts. This 
would be the case regardless of what those concepts may be and 
regardless of the fact that those concepts considered as cultural 
products arise under specific historical conditions.
Further, conceptual frameworks cannot contradict because they 
are not sets of propositions, and so possibility cannot be identified 
with being non-contradictory, as is the case with mathematical 
theories.23 Instead, when we say that all possible conceptual 
frameworks can give rise to descriptions of objective reality, what 
22 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations: Volume 2, trans. J. N. Findlay 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2001), 250.
23 Insofar as a conceptual framework gives rise to a set of tautologies, e.g., “A 
bachelor is an unmarried male,” there is some sense in which a conceptual 
framework could be logically inconsistent, but the condition here is trivial.
we mean by possibility is the possibility of making claims using a 
conceptual framework that can be true or false in a non-trivial sense. 
As we saw in section IV, some conditions for this are given by Peirce 
and Levinas. Namely, a claim that can be true or false in a non-trivial 
sense must have to do with an independent object and also must be 
open to other persons who are able to subject the arbitrariness of my 
individual ego to critique, such that intersubjective verification is 
possible (at least in principle). That this is (at least in part) a function 
of the conceptual framework with which we are making claims can be 
seen by thinking of Immanuel Kant’s Ding an sich24 and Wittgenstein’s 
beetle in a box.25 A conceptual framework which consisted only 
of such concepts as that of an incognizable Ding an sich lacking all 
conceptual structure and that of an essentially private object would 
not allow us to make claims that could be intersubjectively verified, 
and so would not be a “possible” conceptual framework in the 
relevant sense here.
Finally, there is one significant critique of this view that needs 
to be addressed. Namely, it seems that we can, under different 
conceptual frameworks, truly describe the same reality in seemingly 
contradictory ways. For example, the same motion, say, of my arm, 
can be described as physically-caused or as voluntarily-performed. 
However, is this truly a contradiction? Certainly, it is a contradiction 
to call an action both voluntary and involuntary, because these 
concepts belong to the same framework which accords them the 
status of being contradictory.26 Likewise, to call an action both 
physically caused and not caused would be contradictory (though 
admittedly this latter concept is only a limiting concept in the 
conceptual framework of the physical sciences). The concepts of being 
caused and being voluntary, however, belong to different conceptual 
frameworks. Thus, whether or not the ascription of both concepts 
to the same reality is contradictory depends on to what extent 
relevant concepts in the two frameworks can be correlated with 
each other. While there clearly must be some correlation between 
concepts in the conceptual frameworks at hand, such that the same 
reality can be identified under these two different frameworks, this 
24 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner Pluhar (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1996), 317.
25 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 4th ed., trans. G. E. 
M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker, and Joachim Schulte (Hoboken: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), 106.
26 This is naturally an oversimplification. Nevertheless, I think it is clear that 
the same action cannot at the same time be voluntary in the way that my 
making a carefully thought-out decision is, and involuntary in the way that 
snoring in my sleep is.
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is not enough to establish that these latter concepts are translatable 
into each other’s contradictory opposites.27 It is not even enough to 
establish that any direct “translation” is possible, except for perhaps 
in the case of certain fundamental concepts that allow for the same 
object to be recognized across multiple descriptions. Unless we can 
establish the possibility of such a translation, we are free to consider 
true descriptions made under different frameworks like other true 
descriptions with regard to unrelated properties of the same object. 
For example, a word’s qualities of being a noun and being eleven 
letters long have nothing to do with each other, and a word’s having 
a certain number of letters could never contradict its being a certain 
part of speech.
Further, in proposing an alleged correlation between concepts 
under different frameworks, the principle of charity applies. That is 
to say, all other things being equal, we ought to translate descriptions 
made under one framework to descriptions under another such that 
they end up true. Thus, that there be a correlation between conceptual 
frameworks making it possible for true descriptions made under one 
framework to contradict true descriptions made under another is, while 
not impossible, highly implausible.
Hence, the claim that we can find contradictory descriptions of 
reality made under different frameworks that are both true is suspect 
at best. To establish that this is the case would require overwhelming 
evidence to overcome the principle of charity, which tells us that in 
positing correlations between different frameworks, we should always 
tend towards mapping true descriptions under one framework to true 
descriptions under another. Seeming examples, like that of the same 
movement being both voluntary and physically caused, are thus highly 
problematic. The minimal correlation between frameworks necessary 
to identify the caused movement with the voluntary movement is 
insufficient to show that, e.g., the concept “voluntary” maps to “not 
caused.”
VI. CONCLUSION
In the above, I have outlined the position I call full-blooded 
conceptual realism. Under this view, for any possible conceptual 
framework (any conceptual framework allowing for the possibility 
27 This is not to say that there has to be a minimal correlation between any 
two frameworks for them both to be able to give rise to descriptions of 
reality, only that if the same object can be referred to using concepts 
belonging to different frameworks, then there must be a minimal 
correlation so as to make this object identifiable as “the same” across the 
different ways of referring to it (e.g., there need not be any correlation 
between the frameworks of mathematics and of psychology).
of the intersubjective verification of judgments), there is an aspect 
of objective reality which these claims describe. Thus, objective 
knowledge is possible despite these conceptual frameworks arising 
from contingent historical conditions. This position is analogous 
to Balaguer’s full-blooded Platonist position in the philosophy of 
mathematics, according to which all consistent mathematical theories 
truly describe some universe of mathematical objects.
Note that neither position provides a definitive refutation 
of skepticism. Rather, they serve to defuse skeptical arguments 
(Benacerraf’s and Nietzsche’s, respectively) by showing how the 
possibility of knowledge is still conceivable despite conditions that the 
skeptic claims are incompatible with this possibility. While I do think 
such a refutation can be produced, thereby showing that we possess 
objective knowledge, how we possess objective knowledge would 
nonetheless be inexplicable without our having clarified it in advance, 
as we have done here. 
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